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OTC derivatives and central clearing: 
can all transactions be cleared?
The 2007-2009 ﬁ  nancial crisis has led legislators on both sides of the Atlantic to propose laws that would 
require most “standardised” over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives to be cleared centrally. This paper examines 
these proposals. Although OTC derivatives did not cause the crisis, they do facilitate large speculative 
transactions and have the potential to create systemic risk. The main attraction of the central clearing 
proposals is that they will make positions in standardised derivatives more transparent. However, our 
experience from the 2007-2009 crisis suggests that large losses by ﬁ  nancial institutions often arise from 
their positions in non-standard OTC derivatives. The paper argues that one way forward for regulators is 
to require all OTC derivatives (standard and non-standard) to be cleared centrally within three years. This 
would maximise the beneﬁ  ts of netting and reduce systemic risk while making it easier for regulators to 
carry out stress tests. The paper divides OTC derivatives into four categories and suggests how each 
category could be handled for clearing purposes.
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W
hen assessed in terms of its growth over 
the last 30 years, the OTC derivatives 
market has been very successful.  The 
total principal underlying outstanding derivatives 
transactions in the OTC market is currently about 
ten times that for the exchange-traded market. 
Unlike the exchange-traded market, the OTC market 
is largely unregulated. This is likely to change 
soon. The huge derivatives losses experienced by 
ﬁ  nancial institutions during the 2007-2009 ﬁ  nancial 
crisis is leading governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic to propose legislation requiring that some 
OTC derivatives transactions move to central 
clearinghouses. 
Once it has been negotiated between two parties, 
A and B, an OTC derivatives transaction can be 
cleared by being presented to a central clearing 
counterparty (CCP). Assuming the CCP accepts 
the transaction, it becomes the counterparty 
to both A and B. Each of A and B are able to net 
the transaction with other transactions they have 
entered into with other counterparties, providing 
those transactions are also being cleared through 
the CCP. The CCP takes on the credit risk of both A 
and B. It manages this risk by requiring an initial 
margin and calculating daily variation margins. 
It therefore operates in much the same way as a 
clearinghouse does for exchange-traded products 
such as futures. 
 It is anticipated that the legislation will, with some 
exceptions, require “standardised” derivatives to be 
cleared. There are a number of outstanding issues. 
Who will determine what is and is not a standardised 
transaction? (It could be either regulators or the CCPs 
themselves.) Will transactions involving industrial 
end-users be exempt from the CCP requirement? 
(The European Union appears to favor this.) Will 
foreign currency contracts be exempt? (At one 
stage, the US Congress favored this.) What assets 
will be acceptable to meet margin requirements?   
(Obviously cash will be acceptable for both the 
initial margin and variation margins.  Marketable 
securities are usually acceptable in bilateral 
OTC collateralisation agreements, but, given the 
complexity of the multilateral transfers that have to 
be made each day, they might not be an acceptable 
form of variation margin to a CCP.) 
Although the use of CCPs is not yet a legal 
requirement for any OTC derivatives, some credit 
default swaps and interest rate swaps are currently 
being cleared through CCPs such as ICE Trust and 
LCH.Clearnet. Given the global nature of derivatives 
markets, it is obviously important that the laws 
enacted by different governments are similar. Once 
these laws are in place, the amount of business 
channeled through CCPs is likely to increase 
rapidly.  Almost certainly, the Basel Committee 
will impose much higher capital requirements for 
transactions that are cleared bilaterally than for 
those cleared through CCPs. This will reduce any 
incentive derivatives dealers may have to make their 
contracts “slightly nonstandard” in order to avoid 
central clearing requirements.
Channeling OTC derivatives transactions through 
CCPs has two main objectives. The ﬁ  rst is to reduce 
counterparty credit risk. A second is to increase 
transparency so that regulators are more easily able 
to quantify the positions being taken and carry out 
stress tests. This paper argues that it is important 
to ensure that all OTC derivatives are covered 
by the new rules. Credit derivatives were most 
prominent during the last crisis and have received 
most attention from regulators, but unless there is 
careful monitoring it is quite possible that in the 
future big destabilising positions will be taken in 
other derivatives, perhaps ones that have not yet 
even been invented. Acharya et al (2009) argue 
that central clearing should be used for actively 
traded OTC derivatives while others are monitored 
using a central registry. This paper argues that it is 
simpler, and also feasible, to require all derivatives 
to be cleared centrally and to do so in a way that 
makes it relatively easy for regulators to monitor 
exposures and carry out stress tests. The paper 
divides derivatives into four categories and discusses 
how each category can be handled. 
1| BACKGROUND
OTC derivatives markets were developed to 
allow end-users to manage their exposures more 
efﬁ  ciently than is possible with exchange-traded 
markets. The advantage of the OTC market is that 
a transaction can be tailored to meet the precise 
needs of an end-user. For example, when a fund 
manager owns a portfolio of Japanese stocks, but 
thinks that US equities have better prospects over 
the next six months, a total return swap can be 
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a useful tool; when a company has exposures to 
ﬁ  ve different exchange-rates, a basket option can 
be an attractive hedge. 
The end-users of OTC derivatives have made it 
clear to legislators that they are happy with current 
arrangements. They do not want to be forced to post 
margin as this could lead to liquidity problems. Also, 
they do not want derivatives contracts to become 
standardised because this would make them less 
useful for hedging and might result in them not 
qualifying for hedge accounting. (In fact, it is unlikely 
that nonstandard derivatives will be banned. If they 
are not cleared, the regulatory capital requirements for 
nonstandard transactions will probably increase and as 
a result end-users might get slightly less attractive terms.  
But even this might not happen as the economic capital 
required for the transactions should not change.)  
Of course not all OTC derivatives transactions 
can be classiﬁ  ed as “socially useful”. Some involve 
regulatory arbitrage (i.e., reducing the regulatory 
capital a bank has to keep without reducing its 
exposures); some are concerned with changing the 
tax or accounting treatment of an item; occasionally 
an OTC derivative is designed by a dealer to appear 
more attractive than it is to unwary end-users.1 
No doubt, regulators and politicians would love 
to keep the socially useful applications of OTC 
derivatives and outlaw the others. This is unlikely 
to be possible. In this section, we examine some of 
the objectives that might be achieved by regulating 
OTC derivatives.
1|1  OTC derivatives and the crisis
The ﬁ  rst point to make is that OTC derivatives did 
not cause the 2007-2009 ﬁ  nancial crisis (or previous 
ﬁ  nancial crises). The causes of the crisis are complex 
and it would be a mistake to imagine that regulating 
OTC markets will somehow automatically prevent 
similar crises in the future. The crisis was caused by 
a mixture of macroeconomic events, government 
policies, the relaxation of lending standards by 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, and the failure of regulation.2 
If OTC derivatives markets did not exist, a severe 
world recession would still have occurred.  
The crisis that unfolded was a result of low interest 
rates and a relaxation of lending standards by 
banks operating in the US residential mortgage 
market. The story is now familiar to most people.   
The relaxation of mortgage lending standards 
increased the demand for residential real estate, 
pushing up prices very fast during the 2000 to 2006 
period. When some borrowers found that they could 
not service their loans there were foreclosures. This 
increased the supply of real estate and reversed the 
price increases.  A positive feedback loop developed 
where price declines led to more foreclosures which 
in turn led to more price declines. OTC derivatives 
moved the default losses from one entity to another 
in the economy (sometimes in a fairly dramatic 
way), but they did not create the losses. 
Why did US banks relax their lending standards? 
Some people have argued that this would not have 
happened without the development of an OTC 
market for securitising and resecuritising subprime 
mortgages. However, this is at most a small part of the 
story. Many of the tranches formed from subprime 
mortgages found their way back on to the books of 
banks. It seems unlikely that banks would knowingly 
make large numbers of bad loans, securitise them, 
and then buy the securitised products.3  
1|2  OTC derivatives and systemic risk 
Most large ﬁ  nancial institutions have huge portfolios 
of derivatives and their counterparties in many 
of their OTC derivatives transactions are other 
large ﬁ  nancial institutions. This is not because 
large ﬁ  nancial institutions are using the markets 
for nothing more than betting with each other on 
the future direction of market variables. When a 
derivatives dealer enters into a transaction with 
an end-user it typically lays off its risk by entering 
into transactions with other dealers. This is what 
accounts for the vast majority of inter-dealer trades.
1  Some people would include speculation in this list of non-socially-useful applications of OTC derivatives and some large synthetic transactions involving the subprime 
mortgage market have been widely criticised as having no redeeming qualities. However, speculators are an important source of liquidity in many derivatives markets. 
2  For example, Jagannathan et al (2009) argue that the fundamental cause of the crisis was a labor shock where large numbers of workers in developing countries 
found that they could compete with Western workers without relocating. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) similarly contend that increasing global trade imbalances were 
an important contributory factor.
3  The main motivation for banks to securitise mortgage assets and then buy the securitised products was a reduction in regulatory capital.
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The OTC derivatives market is a potential source 
of systemic risk because a default by one large 
ﬁ  nancial institution can lead to losses by other large 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and defaults by these ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. This in turn can lead to yet more losses 
by other ﬁ  nancial institutions and a disaster for 
the ﬁ  nancial system. Regulators are quite rightly 
concerned about this scenario. They have shown at 
the time of the Long Term Capital Markets failure in 
1998 and at several times during the 2007-2009 crisis 
that they are prepared to take swift action to avoid 
any possibility of it happening. 
Perhaps fortunately, we have never allowed 
a situation to develop where the extent of the 
systemic risk losses created by OTC derivatives can 
be observed and measured. It is reassuring that the 
ﬁ  nancial system has survived defaults such as Drexel 
and Lehman without serious problems. It should 
be emphasised that ﬁ  nancial institutions do not 
ignore systemic risk. They devote huge resources 
to managing counterparty risk, particularly that 
resulting from their derivatives transactions with 
other large ﬁ  nancial institutions.4 Bilateral netting 
and collateralisation agreements, although not legal 
requirements, have become the norm for these 
transactions and have led to a huge reduction in 
systemic risk. Table 1 shows that netting reduced 
the aggregate derivatives exposures of dealers from 
USD 25.4 trillion to USD 3.7 trillion in June 2009. 
Much of the USD 3.7 trillion is collateralised, 
reducing counterparty risk much further. 
One of the reasons CCPs are attractive to politicians 
and regulators is that they have the potential to 
increase the beneﬁ  ts of netting and collateralisation 
with the result that counterparty risk is reduced still 
further and there is less chance of systemic risk 
leading to a failure of the ﬁ  nancial system. As will 
be discussed later, they also have the potential to 
make OTC derivatives more transparent and easier 
to regulate.
1|3  OTC derivatives and speculation
OTC derivatives make it easier for ﬁ  nancial 
institutions to take huge risks. Many ﬁ  nancial 
institutions such as Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, and  AIG Financial Products appear to 
have succumbed to the temptation of doing this in 
the ﬁ  rst decade of the 21st century. The AIG situation 
was particularly extreme. The company sold credit 
default swap (CDS) protection against losses on 
the securitised products created from subprime 
mortgages. When the company was downgraded 
below AA, it was required to post a huge amount 
of collateral with its counterparties and was 
unable to do so. The US government provided an 
USD 85 billion injection of funds to avoid a default. 
Would the type of central-clearing legislation 
currently being proposed have prevented the AIG 
ﬁ  asco? The answer is that it probably would not 
have done so. The legislation requires standardised 
CDS transactions to be cleared. It is likely that in, 
say, 2006 the list of standardised derivatives for 
which clearing is required would have included 
single-name CDSs that provide protection against 
defaults by corporate or sovereign entities. It 
would also have included transactions that provide 
protection against losses on standardised portfolios 
such as iTraxx Europe and CDX NA IG. However, the 
AIG transactions were nonstandard. They related to 
losses on tranches created from particular mortgage 
portfolios (and from tranches created from those 
tranches). It is unlikely that the type of legislation 
now being proposed, if enacted ﬁ  ve years ago, would 
have covered them.
Casual empiricism suggests that when large 
speculative positions are taken by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, they are usually in non-standard OTC 
derivatives.5 Regulators should therefore give more 
4  See for example Gregory (2010) and Hull (2010).
5  There are exceptions. Some of the large losses that have been reported (or example, Allied Irish Bank’s loss in 2002) were caused by traders ﬁ  nding ways of hiding the 
exposures created by standard OTC transactions. But in general exposures created by standard OTC derivatives are well understood and therefore less likely to be tolerated.
Table 1
Dealer exposures before and after netting 





Credit default swaps 2,987
Unallocated 2,868
Total 25,372
Total after netting 3,744
Source: BIS, June 2009.
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attention to these instruments. Later this paper 
argues that using CCPs for all OTC derivatives is 
not an unreasonable goal. But, at minimum the 
new regulatory regime for OTC derivatives should 
require non-standard OTC derivatives between 
systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions to be 
subject to two-way collateralisation agreements with 
no threshold.6 Downgrade triggers such as those that 
were used by AIG’s counterparties should not be 
permitted as they tend to exacerbate systemic risk.
An important point here is that, all too often, the 
collateralisation of non-standard OTC derivatives is 
hampered by arguments over their market value. 
When A demands that collateral be posted by B 
because the net value of outstanding transactions 
between them has moved in A’s favor, B may dispute 
the valuation and it may take some time to resolve 
the issue.  If bilateral agreements do remain a feature 
of the OTC derivatives market, a compulsory feature 
of such agreements (at least when a systemically 
important ﬁ  nancial institution is on one side) should 
be that for each transaction either a) a third party 
is designated to calculate the daily market value or 
b) the procedure for calculating the daily market 
value is speciﬁ  ed in the credit support annex.
1|4  OTC derivatives and transparency
One advantage often cited for CCPs is that they 
will bring extra transparency to the OTC market. 
There are two aspects to transparency. One is 
concerned with knowing the market prices of 
instruments traded in the OTC market; the other is 
concerned with knowing the positions taken by the 
ﬁ  nancial institutions trading in the market.
The term “dark markets” has been used to describe 
OTC markets. This is perhaps a little extreme. It is 
notable that market participants such as dealers, 
fund managers and corporate treasurers do not seem 
to the ones complaining about price transparency. 
On-line services such as Bloomberg and Reuters 
disseminate dealer prices to the market. It is true 
that the quote given by a dealer for a plain vanilla 
OTC derivative may depend to a small extent on the 
size of the trade, the dealer’s inventory, the extent 
to which the dealer is capital constrained, the credit 
quality of the counterparty, and other transactions 
that are outstanding with the counterparty. This 
is hardly surprising. It should not be taken as 
evidence that dealers are purposely concealing key 
information from their clients. Highly structured 
transactions such as synthetic CDOs may see a 
bigger price variation from one dealer to another, but 
this is also as one would expect and not something 
that regulators should be concerned about. 
Knowing the transactions undertaken by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions is important to regulators so that they 
are aware of large speculative positions and can 
monitor systemic risk.7 The challenge is to arrange 
for positions to be reported and aggregated so that 
the results are useful to regulators. CCPs have a role 
to play here as we discuss later. It is clearly important 
for regulators to determine the daily changes in 
the values of non-standard transactions as well as 
standardised transaction because, as already pointed 
out, when large speculative positions are taken, they 
tend to be in non-standard transactions.
2| THE ADVANTAGES 
  OF CENTRAL CLEARING
Dufﬁ  e and Zhu (2009) make the important point 
that central clearing does not necessarily improve 
netting efﬁ  ciency. The efﬁ  ciency of central clearing 
depends on the number of CCPs and the proportion 
of all OTC derivatives that are cleared. Central 
clearing always improves netting efﬁ  ciency when 
a single CCP is used for all OTC derivatives. If the 
current legislation leads to, say, 60% of all OTC 
trades being cleared through 10 different CCPs it is 
not necessarily the case that the USD 3,744 billion 
ﬁ  gure in Table 1 will be improved upon. Indeed it 
might get worse.
A simple example will show why this is. We suppose 
that there are three derivatives dealers (A, B, and C) 
and two categories of products, only one of which 
is cleared. (The cleared product category could 
be all standardised OTC derivatives and the non-
cleared category all non-standard OTC derivatives.) 
6    This means that each party has to post with the other collateral equal to the greater of the net value of outstanding transactions to the other party and zero.
7  It is not so clear that others need this information. If it is considered to be in the public interest to give the information to non-regulators, the information should 
be non-current at the time it is made available. Divulging the current positions of a ﬁ  nancial institution to competitors would not be a sensible move. If potential 
counterparties know the hedging trades the ﬁ  nancial institution needs to do, the ﬁ  nancial institution is less likely to get competitive quotes.  
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The mark-to-market value of the dealers’ positions is 
indicated by the arrows in the left part of Figure 1, 
which assumes that all transactions are cleared 
bilaterally. For example, dealer A’s transactions 
with dealer B are worth −100 to dealer A in the 
non-cleared product type and +50 to dealer A in 
the cleared product type. With bilateral clearing the 
net exposures of A, B, and C are  0, 100, and 20, 
respectively. The right part of Figure 1 shows how 
this situation changes when a CCP is used for the 
cleared category. The net exposures of A, B, and 
C, including exposures to the CCP, are now much 
higher at 120, 120, and 90, respectively. Even when 
exposures to the CCP are not included, the average 
of the three exposures is 75% higher than without 
the CCP. 
Extrapolating from this example, netting efﬁ  ciency 
increases as the percentage of OTC trades that are 
cleared increases. With multiple CCPs, the netting 
efﬁ  ciency may decline. However, there is likely 
to be some consolidation of CCPs over time. Also, 
netting agreements between CCPs should develop.   
For example, if a dealer receives 15 from one CCP in 
a day and must pay 25 to another CCP, there could 
be an agreement whereby the dealer has to pay 
10 to the second CCP. The remaining 15 would be 
automatically transferred from the ﬁ  rst CCP.8
Netting efﬁ  ciency is not the only reason (perhaps 
not even the main reason) for central clearing.   
Central clearing will lead to an increase in 
transparency because the positions of different 
dealers can be more readily ascertained. It will be 
lead to more collateral (margin) being posted so that, 
when a dealer defaults, losses are likely to be less. 
Furthermore losses will be distributed throughout 
the clearinghouse members. In the case of bilateral 
clearing, there is a chance that large losses have to 
be absorbed by a small number of counterparties.  
Another important potential advantage of CCPs is 
that they may reduce the chance that unsubstantiated 
rumors lead to the downfall of a dealer. When a 
dealer is thought to be experiencing difﬁ  culties, 
other dealers may stop posting collateral or refuse to 
8  Given that the assets used to satisfy CCP variation margin requirements are likely to be either cash or highly liquid assets, this form of rehypothecation is likely to 
cause far less problems than rehypothecation in bilateral collateralisation agreements. 
Figure 1
Dealer
Exposure after netting 
included CCP
























Example of a situation where a CCP increases exposures after netting. The exposures represented by the dotted line are cleared. Those represented by the solid line 
are not. The exposures after bilateral netting are compared with the exposures when the CCP is used. 
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trade with it or enter into trades that are designed to 
reduce their exposure to the dealer. This may cause 
cash ﬂ  ow problems for the dealer and hasten its 
demise. Arguably, this is less likely to happen when 
trades are done through CCPs because a CCP should 
ignore rumours in calculating and implementing 
variation margins.
Of course, there is a risk that a CCP will fail. 
Traditionally, clearinghouses for exchange-traded 
derivatives have been well run and there have 
been few problems. (Basel II assigns a risk weight 
of zero for trades with a clearinghouse.) 
The consequences of a failure by a CCP that is 
used for OTC trades could be even more disastrous 
than the failure of a large dealer. However, 
a CCP is nothing like as complex as a large bank. 
It should be regulated as utility and not allowed 
to trade on its own account.
3| HOW MUCH CAN BE CLEARED?
There are many reasons for wanting to clear centrally 
as big a proportion of all OTC derivatives trades as 
possible. This maximises the netting beneﬁ  ts of 
central clearing and minimises counterparty risk. 
It also gives regulators a better handle on the risks 
being taken by dealers.
The key requirement for clearing a transaction 
centrally is that it be possible to value the transaction 
daily for the purposes of calculating daily variation 
margins. We have already mentioned that it is 
important to require the parties to any non-cleared 
transaction between systemically important 
counterparties to enter into collateralisation 
agreements for those transactions. They should 
also agree on a method by which the values of 
the transactions are calculated for the purposes 
of the collateralisation agreements. Otherwise 
the collateralisation agreements are liable to be 
ineffective because of disputes about who owes 
whom what. It is a short step from this to argue 
that the valuation methodology should be made 
available to a CCP so that the transaction can be 
cleared centrally.  Furthermore, if the valuation 
methodology can be passed to a CCP, it can be made 
available to regulators for stress testing and other 
analyses they might wish to carry out.
In considering how easy it is to clear OTC derivatives 
transactions, it is useful to divide products into 
four categories: 
1.  Plain vanilla derivatives with standard maturity 
dates; 
2.  Plain vanilla derivatives with non-standard 
maturities dates;
3.  Non-standard derivatives for which there are
well established pricing models;
4.  Highly structured deals.
Derivatives in the ﬁ  rst category are the ones that 
CCPs are likely to be most comfortable with and 
the ones that have the potential to be traded on 
exchanges. Often the current value of transactions 
in the ﬁ  rst category can be observed directly in the 
market.  If this is not the case, it is convenient that 
interest rates, credit spreads, and similar market 
variables are required only for standard maturities. 
(Often the standard maturities are international 
monetary market dates.)
For derivatives in the second category, standard 
procedures are used by the market to interpolate 
variables such as interest rates, credit spreads, 
forward prices of assets, and volatilities so that the 
observable values of these variables can be used to 
calculate required values.  For example, the credit 
spread for a certain maturity can be estimated 
from the observed credit spreads for neighboring 
maturities; the volatility used to price an option 
that has a certain strike price and time to maturity 
can be estimated from the observable volatilities 
of options with neighboring strike prices and times 
to maturity. 
The distinguishing characteristic of derivatives in 
the ﬁ  rst two categories is that they are priced with 
reference to the market prices of other derivatives of 
the same type. CDSs are priced with reference to other 
CDSs; options on an exchange rate are priced with 
reference to other options on that exchange rate. The 
procedure where one derivative is priced using other 
derivatives that trade as reference points is known 
as “calibration.” Derivatives in the ﬁ  rst two categories 
are therefore calibrated to derivatives of the same 
type for the purposes of pricing. 
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Derivatives in the third category are different from 
those in the ﬁ  rst two categories in that they are not 
traded actively enough for them to be calibrated 
to derivatives of the same type for the purposes of 
pricing. There are a wide range of derivatives in the 
third category such as Asian options, barrier options, 
compound options, basket options, accrual swaps, 
and so on. Typically they have to be calibrated to 
other simpler derivatives, and sometimes empirical 
data has to be used. For example, the price of an 
Asian option is usually based on the prices of plain 
vanilla options on the same asset; the price of a 
basket option is usually based on the prices of plain 
vanilla options on the assets comprising the basket 
and correlations between the assets’ prices estimated 
from empirical data; the price of an accrual swap 
is based on the prices of plain vanilla interest rate 
swaps and interest rate caps; and so on.  
It is probably unreasonable to expect a CCP to 
develop the technology to price all OTC derivatives 
in the third category. However, a reasonable 
requirement is that market participants provide 
the CCP with valuation software when the OTC 
derivative is traded. This valuation software would 
conform to input-output requirements speciﬁ  ed by 
the CCP. Typically, what will be provided will be 
a core valuation routine that depends on a set of 
inputs (interest rates, exchange rates, forward prices 
of assets, volatilities, etc). CCPs will be able to use the 
routines they develop for derivatives in the second 
category to carry out interpolations necessary to 
provide the inputs. Models for valuing the derivatives 
in the third category are in the public domain, but 
some dealers are likely to have their own proprietary 
models in some cases. They should not be under an 
obligation to provide those models to the CCP. They 
should be allowed to supply the standard model that 
is in the public domain providing the model captures 
the key properties of the transaction.  
Derivatives in the fourth category are more 
problematic because they are usually quite complex 
and models for valuing them are less readily 
available.  But it is important to ﬁ  nd a way of 
handling them. As mentioned earlier it is often these 
types of derivatives that lead to huge speculative 
positions and have the potential to increase systemic 
risk. Market participants should be given a choice. 
They can either provide software (agreed to by both 
parties) to the CCP or they can appoint a third party 
who will provide daily valuations to the CCP. 
The software at CCPs would be made available to 
regulators for the purposes of stress testing and other 
analyses. In the case of situations where valuations 
for transactions are provided by a third party, the 
third party should be obligated to carry out analyses 
for regulators on the transactions when directed.   
These proposals are designed to ensure that all OTC 
derivatives are cleared and to make it easier for 
regulators to understand and analyse what is going in 
the OTC market. A reasonable time line might involve 
implementing the proposal for all derivatives in the 
ﬁ  rst two categories within one year and implementing 
the proposals for all derivatives in the third and fourth 
categories within three years. Whether it is feasible 
to apply the proposals to outstanding derivatives 
transactions as well as to new transactions needs to 
be given careful consideration. 
One issue is that, when a dealer trades with an 
end-user, the dealer’s inception proﬁ  t is liable to 
lead to a requirement for the end-user to post an 
immediate variation margin. For highly structured 
products the inception proﬁ  t is often seems quite 
high, but is justiﬁ  able because of the difﬁ  culties in 
hedging the product and other uncertainties that the 
dealer faces. It should be permissible for the models 
communicated to CCPs (or used by third parties) 
to amortise the inception proﬁ  t over the life of the 
transaction. This corresponds to the practice of 
many ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
Inevitably there will be some exemptions from 
central clearing. Industrial end-users for example 
are claiming their right to an exemption because 
their dealer-counterparties often do not currently 
require them to post collateral.9 Exemptions can 
be classiﬁ  ed as “zero-margin trades.” They would 
still have to be registered with a CCP and daily 
valuations for them would be required, as for 
trades that are cleared. However, no initial margin 
or variation margin would be required from either 
9  Whether this exemption is necessary is debatable. The reality is that a dealer who does not require collateral is implicitly providing the end-user with a ﬂ  exible line 
of credit that covers possible future values of the transaction to the dealer. Given that the dealer is prepared to do this, it should also be prepared to enter into an 
agreement where it lends the end-user funds sufﬁ  cient to meet the margin amounts required by the CCP.
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